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Abstract
Highly expressive models such as deep neural networks
(DNNs) have been widely applied to various applications.
However, recent studies show that DNNs are vulnerable to
adversarial examples, which are carefully crafted inputs
aiming to mislead the predictions. Currently, the major-
ity of these studies have focused on perturbation added to
image pixels, while such manipulation is not physically re-
alistic. Some works have tried to overcome this limitation
by attaching printable 2D patches or painting patterns onto
surfaces, but can be potentially defended because 3D shape
features are intact. In this paper, we propose meshAdv to
generate “adversarial 3D meshes” from objects that have
rich shape features but minimal textural variation. To ma-
nipulate the shape or texture of the objects, we make use of a
differentiable renderer to compute accurate shading on the
shape and propagate the gradient. Extensive experiments
show that the generated 3D meshes are effective in attack-
ing both classifiers and object detectors. We evaluate the
attack under different viewpoints. In addition, we design
a pipeline to perform black-box attack on a photorealistic
renderer with unknown rendering parameters.
1. Introduction
Despite the increasing successes in various domains [10,
13, 19, 46], deep neural networks (DNNs) are found vul-
nerable to adversarial examples: a deliberate perturbation
of small magnitude on the input can make a network output
incorrect predictions. Such adversarial examples have been
widely studied in 2D domain [5, 17, 37, 40, 49, 55–57],
but the attack generated by directly manipulating pixels can
be defended by securing the camera, so that the generated
images are not realizable in practice. To overcome this is-
sue, there has been significant prior progress on generating
physically possible adversarial examples [1, 4, 14, 29] by
altering the texture of a 3D surface, i.e. applying adversar-
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Figure 1: The pipeline of “adversarial mesh” generation by
meshAdv.
ial printable 2D patches or painting patterns. Such attacks,
however, are less suitable for textureless objects, because
adding texture to an otherwise textureless surface may in-
crease the chance of being detected and defended.
In this work, we explore a new avenue of attack where
we generate physically possible adversarial examples by al-
tering 3D shape. We explore 3D objects that have rich shape
features but minimal texture variation, and show that we can
still fulfill the adversarial goal by perturbing the shape of
those 3D objects, while the same method can still be ap-
plied to textures. Specifically, we propose meshAdv to gen-
erate adversarial meshes with negligible perturbations. We
leverage a physically based differentiable renderer [26] to
accurately render the mesh under certain camera and light-
ing parameters. A deep network then outputs a prediction
given the rendered image as input. Since this whole process
is differentiable, gradients can be propagated from the net-
work prediction back to the shape or texture of the mesh.
Therefore, we can use gradient based optimization to gen-
erate shape based or texture based perturbation by applying
losses on the network output. The entire pipeline is shown
in Figure 1.
Even though we are only manipulating physical proper-
ties (shape and texture) of a 3D object, we can always fool
state of the art DNNs (see Section 6.2). Specifically, we
show that for any fixed rendering conditions (i.e. lighting
and camera parameters), state of the art object classifiers
(DenseNet [22] and Inception-v3 [50]) and detector (Yolo-
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v3 [44]) can be consistently tricked by slightly perturbing
the shape and texture of 3D objects. We further show that by
using multiple views optimization, the attack success rate
of “adversarial meshes” increases under various viewpoints
(see Table 2). In addition, we conduct user studies to show
that the generated perturbation are negligible to human per-
ception.
Since the perturbation on meshes is adversarially opti-
mized with the help of a differentiable renderer, a natural
question to ask is whether a similar method can be ap-
plied in practice when the rendering operation is not dif-
ferentiable. We try to answer this question by proposing a
pipeline to perform black-box attack on a photorealistic ren-
derer (with non-differentiable rendering operation) under
unknown rendering parameters. We show that via estimat-
ing the rendering parameters and improving the robustness
of perturbation, our generated “adversarial meshes” can at-
tack on a photorealistic renderer.
Additionally, we visualize our shape based perturbation
to show possible vulnerable regions for meshes. This can be
beneficial when we hope to improve the robustness (against
shape deformation) of machine learning models that are
trained on 3D meshes [7, 47, 59] for different tasks such
as view point estimation [48], indoor scene understand-
ing [18, 36, 47, 61] and so on [8, 35, 45, 52, 58].
To summarize, our contributions are listed below: 1) We
propose an end-to-end optimization based method meshAdv
to generate 3D “adversarial meshes” with negligible pertur-
bations, and show that it is effective in attacking different
machine learning tasks; 2) We demonstrate the effectiveness
of our method on a black-box non-differentiable renderer
with unknown parameters; 3) We provide insights into vul-
nerable regions of a mesh via visualizing the flow of shape
based perturbations; 4) We conduct user studies to show that
our 3D perturbation is subtle enough and will not affect user
recognition.
2. Related Work
Adversarial Attacks Adversarial examples have been
heavily explored in 2D domains [17, 37, 40, 49, 56, 57],
but directly manipulation of image pixels requires access to
cameras. To avoid this, physical adversarial examples stud-
ied in [14, 29] show impressive robust adversarial examples
under camera transformations. However, the perturbations
are textured based and may not be applied to arbitrary 3D
shapes.
Meanwhile, Athalye et al. [1] further advance texture
based adversarial examples by enhancing the robustness
against color transformations, and show that the generated
textures for a turtle and a baseball that can make the them
fool a classifier under various different viewpoints. In this
exciting work, the 3D objects serve as a surface to carry
information-rich and robust textures that can fool classi-
fiers. In our work, we also focus on perturbation on 3D
objects, but we explicitly suppress the effect of textures by
starting from 3D objects [54] that have constant reflectance.
Even with constant reflectance, those 3D objects such as
airplanes, bicycles, are easily recognizable due to their dis-
tinctive 3D shape features. In this way, we highlight the
importance of these shape features of objects in adversarial
attacks.
Beyond perturbations in texture form, Zeng et al. [60]
perturbed the physical parameters (normal, illumination and
material) for untargeted attacks against 3D shape classi-
fication and a VQA system. However, for the differen-
tiable renderer, they assume that the camera parameters are
known beforehand and then perturb 2D normal maps un-
der the fixed projection. This may limit the manipulation
space and may also produce implausible shapes. For the
non-differentiable renderer in their work, they have to use
derivative-free optimization for attacks. In comparison, our
method can generate plausible shapes directly in mesh rep-
resentation using gradient based optimization methods.
A concurrent work [32] proposes to manipulate lighting
and geometry to perform attacks. However, there are several
differences compared to our work: 1) Magnitude of pertur-
bation. The perturbation in [32] such as lighting change is
visible, while we achieve almost unnoticeable perturbation
which is important in adversarial behaviors. 2) Targeted
attack. Based on the objective function in [32] and exper-
imental results, the adversarial targets seem close to each
other, such as jaguar and elephant. In our work, we explic-
itly force the object from each class to be targeted-attacked
into all other classes with almost 100% attack success rate.
3) Renderers. We perform attacks based on the state-of-the-
art open-source differentiable renderer [28], which makes
our attacks more accessible and reproducible, while in [32]
a customized renderer is applied and it is difficult to tell
whether such vulnerabilities come from the customized ren-
derer or the manipulated object. 4) Realistic attacks. Ma-
nipulating lighting is less realistic in open environments.
Compared with their attacks on lighting and shape, we pro-
pose to manipulate shape and texture of meshes which are
easier to conduct in practice. 5) Victim learning models. We
attack both classifiers and object detectors, which is widely
used in safety-sensitive applications such as autonomous
driving, while they only attack classifiers.
Differentiable Renderers Besides adversarial attacks, dif-
ferentiable renderers have been used in many other tasks
as well, including inverse rendering [2, 16], 3D morphable
face reconstruction [16], texture optimization [38] and so
on [30]. In these tasks, gradient based optimization can
be realized due to readily available differentiable render-
ers [16, 26, 30, 33, 39, 43]. We also used a differentiable
renderer called Neural Mesh Renderer [26], which is fast
and can be integrated into deep neural networks effortlessly.
Watermarking for Meshes While mesh watermarking is
also achieved by manipulating the meshes in a subtle way,
the goal is different from ours: it is to hide secret data in
the geometry by satisfying strict properties of vertices and
edges [6, 42]; our task is to perturb the mesh as long as the
rendered image can fool a learning model while keeping the
mesh perceptual realistic. On the other hand, the challenges
in developing 3D mesh watermarking helps to emphasize
the challenges for our attack given the difficulties of gener-
ating perturbation in 3D domains.
3. Problem Definition and Challenges
In 2D domain, let g be a machine learning model trained
to map a 2D image I to its category label y. For g, an adver-
sarial attacker targets to generate an adversarial image Iadv
such that g(Iadv) 6= y (untargeted attack) or g(Iadv) = y′
(targeted attack), where y is the groundtruth label and y′ is
our specified malicious target label.
Unlike adversarial attacks in 2D space, here the image I
is a rendered result of a 3D object S: I = R(S;P,L), com-
puted by a physically based renderer R with camera param-
eters P and illumination parameters L. In other words, it
is not allowed to directly operate the pixel values of I , and
one has to manipulate the 3D object S to generate Sadv such
that the rendered image of it will fool g to make incorrect
predictions: Iadv = R(Sadv;P,L).
Achieving the above goals is non-trivial due to the fol-
lowing challenges: 1) Manipulation space: When render-
ing 3D contents, shape, texture and illumination are entan-
gled together to generate the pixel values in a 2D image,
so image pixels are no longer independent with each other.
This means the manipulation space can be largely reduced
due to image parameterization. 2) Constraints in 3D: 3D
constraints such as physically possible shape geometry and
texture are not directly reflected on 2D [60]. Human percep-
tion of an object are in 3D or 2.5D [34], and perturbation of
shape or texture on 3D objects may directly affect human
perception of them. This means it can be challenging to
generate unnoticeable perturbations on 3D meshes.
4. Methodology
Here we assume the rendererR is known (i.e. white box)
and differentiable to the input 3D object S in mesh repre-
sentation. To make a renderer R differentiable, we have to
make several assumptions regarding object material, light-
ing models, interreflection etc. Please refer to supplemen-
tary material for more details on differentiable rendering
and mesh representation. With a differentiable renderer, we
can use gradient-based optimization algorithms to generate
the mesh perturbations in an end-to-end manner, and we de-
note this method meshAdv.
4.1. Optimization Objective
We optimize the following objective loss function with
respect to Sadv, given model g and target label y′:
L(Sadv; g, y′) = Ladv(Sadv; g, y′) + λLperceptual(Sadv) (1)
In this equation, Ladv is the adversarial loss to fool the
model g into predicting a specified target y′ (i.e. g(Iadv) =
y′), given the rendered image Iadv = R(Sadv;P,L) as in-
put. Lperceptual is the loss to keep the “adversarial mesh”
perceptually realistic. λ is a balancing hyper-parameter.
We further instantiate Ladv and Lperceptual in the next
subsections, regarding different tasks (classification or ob-
ject detection) and perturbation types (shape or texture).
4.1.1 Adversarial Loss
Classification For a classification model g, the output
is usually the probability distribution of object categories,
given an image of the object as the input. We use the cross
entropy loss [11] as the adversarial loss for meshAdv:
Ladv(Sadv; g, y′) = y′ log(g(Iadv))+(1−y′) log(1−g(Iadv)),
(2)
where Iadv = R(Sadv;P,L), and y′ is one-hot representa-
tion of the target label.
Object Detection For object detection, we choose a state-
of-the-art model Yolo-v3 [44] as our victim model. It di-
vides the input image I into Z × Z different grid cells. For
each grid cell, Yolo-v3 predicts the locations and label con-
fidence values of B bounding boxes. For each bounding
box, it generates 5 values (4 for the coordinates and 1 for
the objectness score) and a probability distribution over N
classes. Here the adversary’s goal is to make the victim
object disappear from the object detector, called disappear-
ance attack. So we use the disappearance attack loss [15]
as our adversarial loss for Yolo-v3:
Ladv(Sadv; g, y′) = max
z∈Z2,b∈B
H(z, b, y′, g(Iadv)), (3)
where Iadv = R(Sadv;P,L), and H(·) is a function to rep-
resent the probabilities of label y′ for bounding box b in the
grid cell z, given Iadv as input of model g.
4.1.2 Perceptual Loss
To keep the “adversarial mesh” perceptually realistic, we
leverage a Laplacian loss similar to the total variation
loss [53] as our perceptual loss:
Lperceptual(Sadv) =
∑
i
∑
q∈N (i)
‖Iadvi − Iadvq ‖22, (4)
where Ii is the RGB vector of the i-th pixel in the image
Iadv = R(Sadv;P,L), and N (i) is the 4-connected neigh-
bors of pixel i.
We apply this smoothing loss to the image when generat-
ing texture based perturbation for Sadv. However, for shape
based perturbation, manipulation of vertices may intro-
duce unwanted mesh topology change, as reported in [26].
Therefore, instead of using Eq. (4), we perform smoothing
on the displacement of vertices such that neighboring ver-
tices will have similar displacement flow. We achieve this
by extending the smoothing loss to 3D vertex flow, in the
form of a Laplacian loss:
Lperceptual(Sadv) =
∑
vi∈V
∑
vq∈N (vi)
‖∆vi −∆vq‖22, (5)
where ∆vi = vadvi − vi is the displacement of the per-
turbed vertex vadvi from its original position vi in the pris-
tine mesh, and N (vi) denotes connected neighboring ver-
tices of vi defined by mesh triangles.
5. Transferability to Black-Box Renderers
Our meshAdv aims to white-box-attack the system
g(R(S;P,L)) by optimizing S end-to-end since R is dif-
ferentiable. However, we hope to examine the potential of
meshAdv for 3D objects in practice, where the actural ren-
derer may be unavailable.
We formulate this as a black-box attack against a non-
differentiable rendererR′ under unknown rendering param-
eters P ∗, L∗, i.e. we have limited access to R′ but we still
want to generate Sadv such that R′(Sadv, P ∗, L∗) fools the
model g. Because we have no assumptions on the black-box
renderer R′, it can render photorealistic images at a high
computational cost, by enabling interreflection, occlusion
and rich illumination models etc. such that the final image
is an accurate estimate under real-world physics as if cap-
tured by a real camera. In this case, the transferability of
“adversarial meshes” generated by meshAdv is crucial since
we want to avoid the expensive computation in R′ and still
be able to generate such Sadv.
We analyze two scenarios for such transferability.
Controlled Rendering Parameters Before black-box at-
tacks, we want to first test our “adversarial meshes” di-
rectly under the same rendering configuration (lighting pa-
rameters L, camera parameters P ), only replacing the the
differentiable renderer R with the photorealistic renderer
R′. In other words, while Iadv = R(Sadv;P,L) can fool
the model g as expected, we would like to see whether
I ′adv = R′(Sadv;P,L) can still fool the model g.
Unknown Rendering Parameters In this scenario, we
would like to use meshAdv to attack a non-differentiable
system g(R′(S;P ∗, L∗)) under fixed, unknown rendering
parameters P ∗, L∗. In practice, we will have access to the
mesh S and its mask M in the original photorealistic ren-
dering I ′ = R′(S;P ∗, L∗), as well as the model g. Directly
transfer from one renderer to another may not work due to
complex rendering conditions. To improve the performance
of such black-box attack, we propose a pipeline as follows:
1. Estimate camera parameters Pˆ by reducing the er-
ror of object silhouette ‖Rmask(S;P ) −M‖2, where
Rmask(S;P ) renders the mask of the object S (light-
ing is irrelevant to produce the mask);
2. Given Pˆ , estimate lighting parameters Lˆ by reduc-
ing the masked error of rendered images: ‖M ◦
(R(S; Pˆ , L)−I ′)‖2, where the operator ◦ is Hadamard
product;
3. Given Pˆ , Lˆ, use meshAdv to generate the “adversarial
mesh” Sadv such that R(Sadv; Pˆ , Lˆ) fools g; To im-
prove robustness, we add random perturbations to Pˆ
and Lˆ when optimizing;
4. Test Sadv in the original scene with photorealistic ren-
derer R′: obtain the prediction g(R′(Sadv;P ∗, L∗)).
6. Experimental Results
In this section, we first show the attack effectiveness of
“adversarial meshes" generated by meshAdv against clas-
sifiers under different settings. We then visualize the per-
turbation flow of vertices to better understand the vulner-
able regions of those 3D objects. User studies show that
the proposed perturbation is subtle and will not mislead hu-
man recognition. In addition, we show examples of ap-
plying meshAdv to object detectors in physically realistic
scenes. Finally, we evaluate the transferability of “adver-
sarial meshes” generated by meshAdv and illustrate how to
use such transferability to attack a black-box renderer.
6.1. Experimental Setup
For victim learning models g, we choose DenseNet [22]
and Inception-v3 [50] trained on ImageNet [12] for classifi-
cation, and Yolo-v3 trained on COCO [31] for object detec-
tion. For meshes (S), we preprocess CAD models in PAS-
CAL3D+ [54] using uniform mesh resampling with Mesh-
Lab [9] to increase triangle density. Since these 3D ob-
jects have constant texture values, for texture perturbation
we also start from constant as pristine texture.
For the differentiable renderer (R), we use the off-the-
shelf PyTorch implementation [28, 41] of the Neural Mesh
Renderer (NMR) [26] to generate “adversarial meshes”. For
rendering settings (R(·;P,L)) when attacking classifiers,
we randomly sample camera parameters P and lighting pa-
rameters L, and filter out configurations such that the clas-
sification models have 100% accuracy when rendering pris-
tine meshes. These rendering configurations are then fixed
for evaluation, and we call meshes rendered under these
configurations PASCAL3D+ renderings. In total, we have
Perturbation
Type Model
Test
Accuracy
Best Case Average Case Worst Case
Avg. Distance Succ. Rate Avg. Distance Succ. Rate Avg. Distance Succ. Rate
Shape
DenseNet 100.0% 8.4× 10−5 100.0% 1.8× 10−4 100.0% 3.0× 10−4 100.0%
Inception-v3 100.0% 4.8× 10−5 100.0% 1.2× 10−4 99.8% 2.3× 10−4 98.6%
Texture
DenseNet 100.0% 3.8× 10−3 100.0% 1.1× 10−2 99.8% 2.6× 10−2 98.6%
Inception-v3 100.0% 3.7× 10−3 100.0% 1.3× 10−2 100.0% 3.2× 10−2 100.0%
Table 1: Attack success rate of meshAdv and average distance of generated perturbation for different models and different
perturbation types. We choose rendering configurations in PASCAL3D+ renderings such that the models have 100% test
accuracy on pristine meshes so as to confirm the adversarial effects. The average distance for shape based perturbation is
computed using the 3D Laplacian loss from Equation 5. The average distance for texture based perturbation is the root-mean-
squared error of face color change.
7 classes, and for each class we generate 72 different ren-
dering configurations. More details are shown in the sup-
plementary material.
For optimizing the objective, we use Adam [27] as our
solver. In addition, we select the hyperparameter λ in Equa-
tion 1 using binary search, with 5 rounds of search and 1000
iterations for each round.
6.2. MeshAdv on Classification
In this section, we evaluate quantitative and qualitative
performance of meshAdv against classifiers.
For each sample in our PASCAL3D+ renderings, we try
to targeted-attack it into the other 6 categories. Next, for
each perturbation type (shape and texture) and each model
(DenseNet and Inception-v3), we split the results into three
different cases similar to [5]: Best Case means we attack
samples within one class to other classes and report on the
target class that is easiest to attack. Average Case means
we do the same but report the performance on all of the tar-
get classes. Similarly, Worst case means that we report on
the target class that is hardest to attack. The correspond-
ing results are shown in Table 1, including attack success
rate of meshAdv, and the evaluation on generated shape and
texture based perturbation respectively. For shape based
perturbation, we use the Laplacian loss from Equation 5
as the distance metric. For texture based perturbation, we
compute the root-mean-square distance of texture values for
each face of the mesh:
√
1
m
∑m
i=1(t
adv
i − ti)2, where ti is
the texture color of the i-th face among the mesh’s total m
faces. The results show that meshAdv can achieve almost
100% attack success rate for either adversarial perturbation
types.
Figure 2 shows the generated “adversarial meshes”
against Inception-v3 after manipulating the vertices and tex-
ture respectively. The diagonal shows the images rendered
with the pristine meshes. The target class of each “adver-
sarial mesh” is shown at the top, and similar results for
DenseNet are included in the supplementary material. Note
that the samples in the image are randomly selected and not
manually curated. It is worth noting that the perturbation
on object shape or texture, generated by meshAdv, is barely
noticeable to human, while being able to mislead classifiers.
To help assess the vertex displacement in shape perturba-
tion, we discuss the flow visualization and human percep-
tual study in the following paragraphs.
Visualizing Vertex Manipulation In order to better un-
derstand the vulnerable regions of 3D objects, in Figure 3,
we visualize the magnitude of the vertex manipulation flow
using heatmaps. The heatmaps in the figure correspond to
the ones in Figure 2(a). We adopt two viewpoints in this fig-
ure: the rendered view (i), which is the same as the one used
for rendering the images; and the canonical view (ii), which
is achieved by fixing camera parameters for all shapes: we
set the azimuth angle to 135◦ and the elevation angle to 45◦.
From the heatmaps we observe that the regions with large
curvature value and close to the camera (such as edges) are
more vulnerable, as shown in the example in Figure 3(d).
We find this is reasonable, since vertex displacement in
those regions will bring significant change to normals, thus
affecting the shading from the light sources and causing the
screen pixel value to change drastically.
In addition to magnitude, we additionally show an ex-
ample of flow directions in Figure 3(c), which is a close-up
3D quiver plot of the vertex flow in the vertical stabilizer
region of an aeroplane. In this example, the perturbed aero-
plane mesh is classified to “bicycle” in its rendering. From
this figure, we observe that the adjacent vertices tend to flow
towards similar directions, illustrating the effect of our 3D
Laplacian loss operated on vertex flows (Equation 5).
Human Perceptual Study We conduct a user study on
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) in order to quantify the
realism of the adversarial meshes generated by meshAdv.
We uploaded the adversarial images which are misclassified
by DenseNet and Inception-v3. Participants were asked to
recognize those adversarial object to one of the two classes
(the ground-truth class and the adversarial target class). The
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(b) Perturbation on texture
Figure 2: Benign images (diagonal) and corresponding ad-
versarial examples generated by meshAdv on PASCAL3D+
renderings tested on Inception-v3. Adversarial target
classes are shown at the top. We show perturbation on (a)
shape and (b) texture. Similar results for DenseNet can be
found in the supplementary material.
order of these two classes was randomized and the adver-
sarial objects are appeared for 2 seconds in the middle of
the screen during each trial. After disappearing, the partici-
pant has unlimited time to select the more feasible class ac-
cording to their perception. For each participant, one could
only conduct at most 50 trials, and each adversarial image
was shown to 5 different participants. The detailed settings
of our human perceptual study are described in the supple-
mentary material. In total, we collect 3820 annotations from
49 participants. In 99.29 ± 1.96% of trials the “adversarial
meshes” were recognized correctly, indicating that our ad-
versarial perturbation will not mislead human as they can
almost always assign the correct label of these “3D adver-
sarial meshes”.
Multiview Robustness Analysis In addition to a fixed
camera when applying meshAdv, we also explore the ro-
bustness of meshAdv against a range of viewpoints for shape
based perturbation. First, we create a victim set of images
rendered under 5, 10 or 15 different azimuth angles for opti-
mizing the attack. We then sample another 20 unseen views
within the range for test. The results are shown in Table 2.
We can see that the larger the azimuth range is, the harder
to achieve high attack success rate. In the meantime, me-
shAdv can achieve relatively high attack success rate when
more victim instances are applied for training. As a re-
sult, it shows that the attack robustness can potentially be
improved under various viewpoints by optimizing on large
victim set.
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(b) Canonical view
(c) Vertex flow of an “adversarial mesh”
targeting “bicycle”
(d) Perturbation (top)
vs curvature (bottom)
Figure 3: (a) and (b) are visualization of shape based pertur-
bation with respect to Figure 2(a). (c) is a close view of flow
directions, and (d) is an example to compare the magnitude
of perturbation with the magnitude of curvature. Warmer
color indicates greater magnitude and vice versa.
Victim Set Size Azimuth Range
45◦ ∼ 60◦ 35◦ ∼ 70◦ 15◦ ∼ 75◦
5 views 67% 45% 28%
10 views 73% 58% 38%
15 views 79% 74% 48%
Table 2: Targeted attack success rate for unseen camera
views. We attack using 5, 10, or 15 views, and test with
20 unseen views in the same range.
6.3. MeshAdv on Object Detection
For object detection, we use Yolo-v3 [44] as our target
model.
Indoor Scene First, we test meshAdv within the indoor
scene which is pure synthetic. We compose the scene man-
ually with a desk and a chair to simulate an indoor setting,
and place in the scene a single directional light with low am-
bient light. We then put the Stanford Bunny mesh [51] onto
the desk, and show that by manipulating either the shape or
the texture of the mesh, we can achieve the goal of either
removing the target table detection or removing all detec-
tions while keeping the perturbation almost unnoticeable,
(a) Benign
(b) Table | Shape (c) All | Shape
(d) Table|Texture (e) All | Texture
Figure 4: “Adversarial meshes” generated by meshAdv in a
synthetic indoor scene. (a) represents the benign rendered
image and (b)-(e) represent the rendered images from “ad-
versarial meshes” by manipulating the shape or texture. We
use the format “adversarial target | perturbation type” to de-
note the victim object aiming to hide and the type of pertur-
bation respectively.
(a) S | GT (b) Sadv | Dog (c) S | GT (d) Sadv|Bicycle
Figure 5: “Adversarial meshes” generated by meshAdv for
an outdoor photo. (a) and (c) show images rendered with
pristine meshes as control experiments, while (b) and (d)
contain “adversarial meshes” by manipulating the shape.
We use the format “ S/Sadv | target” to denote the be-
nign/adversarial 3D meshes and the target to hide from the
detector respectively.
as shown in Figure 4.
Outdoor Scene Given a real photo of an outdoor scene,
we hope to remove the detections of real objects in the
photo. Different from the indoor sceen in which lighting
is known, we have to estimate the parameters of a sky light-
ing model [21] using the API provided by Hold-Geoffroy
et al. [20] as groundtruth lighting and adapt to the differen-
tiable renderer. We then use this lighting to render our mesh
onto the photo. In the real photo, we select the dog and the
bicycle as our target objects and aim to remove the detec-
tion one at a time. We show that we successfully achieve
the adversarial goal with barely noticeable perturbation, as
in Figure 5.
6.4. Transferability to Black-Box Renderers
As mentioned in Section 5, the final adversarial goal is
to black-box attack a system g(R′(S;P,L)) in which the
Model/Target aeroplane bicycle boat bottle
DenseNet 65.2% 69.1% 66.7% 63.0%
Inception-v3 67.1% 83.3% 39.6% 76.9%
Model/Target chair diningtable sofa average
DenseNet 37.1% 70.3% 47.9% 59.8%
Inception-v3 32.1% 75.0% 52.3% 60.9%
Table 3: Untargeted attack success rate against Mitsuba by
transferring “adversarial meshes” generated by attacking a
differentiable renderer targeting different classes.
Figure 6: Confusion matrices of targeted success rate for
evaluating transferability of “adversarial meshes” on differ-
ent classifiers. Left: DenseNet; right: Inception-v3.
renderer R′ is a computationally intensive renderer that is
able to produce photorealistic images. Here we choose Mit-
suba [24] as such renderer, and focus on shape based per-
turbation.
Controlled Rendering Parameters Before perform such
attacks, we first evaluate the transferability under controlled
parameters. We directly render the “adversarial meshes”
Sadv generated in Section 6.2 using Mitsuba, with the same
lighting and camera parameters. We then calculate the tar-
geted/untargeted attack success rate by feeding the Mitsuba-
rendered images to the same victim classification models
g. The result of untargeted attacks are shown in Table 3,
and the confusion matrices for targeted attacks are show in
Figure 6. We observe that for untargeted attack, the “ad-
versarial meshes” can be transferred to Mitsuba with rela-
tively high atttack success rate for untargeted attack; while
as shown in Figure 6, the targeted attack barely transfers in
this straightforward setting.
Unknown Rendering Parameters To more effectively
targeted attack the system g(R′(S;P ∗, L∗)) when render-
ing parameters P ∗, L∗ are unknown, we apply the pipeline
from Section 5 on a classifier and an object detector, re-
spectively. we first use the Adam optimizer [27] to obtain
the camera estimate Pˆ , then estimate the lighting L∗ us-
ing 5 directional lights and an ambient light Lˆ. Note that
Viewpoint and lighting estimate
Black-box rendering of an airplane mesh
Prediction: “airliner”
NMR rendering + Background
(d, θ, φ, ψ)
Re-render using the black-box renderer
Prediction: “hammerhead”
Shape perturbations by MeshAdv
Target: “hammerhead”
Figure 7: Transferability of “adversarial meshes” against classifiers in unknown rendering environment. We estimate the
camera viewpoint and lighting parameters using the differentiable renderer NMR, and apply the generated “adversarial mesh”
to the photorealistic renderer Mitsuba. The “airliner” is misclassified to the target class “hammerhead” after rendered by
Mitsuba.
(a) Benign (b) S | NMR (c) S |Mitsuba (d) Sadv | NMR (e) Sadv |Mitsuba
Figure 8: Transferability of “adversarial meshes” against object detectors in unknown rendering environment. (b) (c) are
controlled experiments. Sadv is generated using NMR (d), targeting to hide the leftmost chair (see red arrows), and the
adversarial mesh is tested on Mitsuba (e). We use “S/Sadv | renderer" to denote whether the added object is adversarially
optimized and the renderer that we aim to attack with transferability respectively.
the groundtruth lighting L∗ spatially varies due to inter-
reflection and occlusion, so it is impossible to have an ex-
act estimate using the global lighting model in NMR. Then
we manipulate the shape Sadv in the NMR until the image
Iadv = R(Sadv : Pˆ , Lˆ) can successfully targeted-attack the
classifier or the object detector g with a high confidence.
During this process, we add small random perturbation to
the estimated parameters (Pˆ , Lˆ) such that Sadv will be more
robust under uncertainties. For testing, we re-render Sadv
with Mitsuba using the original setting and test the rendered
image I ′adv = R′(Sadv, P ∗, L∗) on the same model g.
For classification, we place an aeroplane object from
PASCAL3D+ and put it in an outdoor scene under sky light.
As is shown in Figure 7, we successfully attacked the clas-
sifier to output the target “hammerhead” by replacing the
pristine mesh with our “adversarial mesh” in the original
scene. Note that even we do not have an accurate lighting
estimate, we still achieve the transferability by adding per-
turbation to lighting parameters. For object detection, we
modified a scene from [3], and placed the Stanford Bunny
object into the scene. The adversarial goal here is to remove
the leftmost chair in the image. Without an accurate lighting
estimate, Figure 8 shows that the “adversarial meshes” can
still successfully remove the target (the leftmost chair) from
the detector.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed meshAdv to generate “adver-
sarial meshes” by manipulating the shape or the texture of
a mesh. These “adversarial meshes” can be rendered to
2D domains to mislead different machine learning models.
We evaluate meshAdv quantitatively and qualitatively using
CAD models from PASCAL3D+, and also show that the ad-
versarial behaviors of our “adversarial meshes” can transfer
to black-box renderers. This provides us a better under-
standing of adversarial behaviors of 3D meshes in practice,
and can motivate potential future defenses.
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Supplemental Material
A. Formulation of Differentiable Rendering
A physically based renderer R computes a 2D image I = R(S;P,L) with camera parameters P , a 3D object S and
lighting parameters L by approximating physics, e.g. the rendering equation [23, 25]. A differentiable renderer makes such
computation differentiable w.r.t. the input S, P, L by making assumptions on illumination models and surface reflectance,
and simplifying the ray-casting process. Following common practice, we use 3D triangular meshes for object representation,
Lambertian surface for surface modeling, directional lighting with a uniform ambient for illumination, and ignore interreflec-
tion and shadows. Here, we further explain the details regarding 3D mesh representation S = (V, F, T ), illumination model
L and camera parameters P used in differentiable rendering in this work.
For a 3D object S in 3D triangular mesh representation, let V be the set of its n vertices in 3D space, and F be the indices
of its m faces:
V = {v1,v2, · · · ,vn ∈ R3}, F = {f1,f2, · · · ,fm ∈ N3} (S1)
For textures, traditionally, they are represented by 2D texture images and mesh surface parameterization such that the texture
images can be mapped onto the mesh’s triangles. For simplicity, here we attach to each triangular face a single RGB color as
its reflectance:
T = {t1, t2, · · · , tm ∈ R+3} (S2)
For illumination model, we use k directional light sources plus an ambient light. The lighting directions are denoted Ldir,
and the lighting colors (in RGB color space) are denoted as Lcolor for directional light sources and a for the ambient light:
Ldir = {ld1, ld2, · · · ldk ∈ R3}, Lcolor = {lc1, lc2, · · · lck ∈ R3} (S3)
We put the mesh S = (V, F, T ) at the origin (0, 0, 0), and set up our perspective camera following a common practice:
the camera viewpoint is described by a quadruple P = (d, θ, φ, ψ), where d is the distance of the camera to the origin, and θ,
φ, ψ are azimuth, elevation and tilt angles respectively. Note that here we assume the camera intrinsics are fixed and we only
need gradients for the extrinsic parameters P .
Given the above description, the 2D image produced by the differentiable renderer can be symbolized as follows:
I = rasterize(P, T · shading(L,normal(V, F ))) (S4)
normal(·, ·) computes the normal direction ni for each triangular face fi in the mesh, by computing the cross product of
the vectors along two edges of the face:
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shading computes the shading intensity si on the face given the face normal direction ni and lighting parameters:
si = a +
k∑
i=1
lci max(l
d
i · ni, 0) (S6)
Given face reflectance ti for each face i, we compute the color ci of each face i by elementwise multiplication:
ci = ti ◦ si (S7)
rasterize projects the computed face colors ci in 3D space onto the 2D camera plane by raycasting and depth testing. We
also cap the color values to [0, 1].
For implementation, we use the off-the-shelf PyTorch implementation [28, 41] of the Neural Mesh Renderer (NMR) [26].
B. MeshAdv on Classification
Creation of PASCAL3D+ Renderings For classification, we create PASCAL3D+ renderings using CAD models from
PASCAL3D+ [54]. Those meshes are then scaled to [−1, 1] and put into the scene. Then, we use Neural Mesh Renderer
(NMR) to generate synthetic renderings using these unitized meshes with uniformly sampled random camera parameters:
azimuth from [0◦, 360◦), elevation from [0◦, 90◦]. As for lighting, we used a directional light and an ambient light for
PASCAL3D+ Renderings. The direction is uniformly sampled in a cone such that the angle between the view and the lighting
direction is less than 60◦.
In order to obtain the groundtruth labels, we map the object classes in PASCAL3D+ to the corresponding classes in
the ImageNet. Next, we feed the synthetic renderings to DenseNet and Inception-v3 and filter out the samples that are
misclassified by either network, so that both models have 100% prediction accuracy on our PASCAL3D+ renderings. We
then save the rendering configurations for evaluation of meshAdv.
Additional Results for DenseNet Figure A shows the generated “adversarial meshes” against DenseNet, similar to Fig-
ure. 2 in the main paper.
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Figure A: Benign images (diagonal) and corresponding adversarial meshes generated by meshAdv on PASCAL3D+ shapes
against DenseNet, targeting at different classes as shown on the top . (a) Presents the “adversarial meshes” by manipulating
the shape; (b) by manipulating texture.
C. Human Perceptual Study Procedures
We conduct a user study on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) in order to quantify the realism of the “adversarial meshes”
generated by meshAdv. We uploaded the adversarial images on which DenseNet and Inception-v3 misclassify the object.
Participants were asked to classify those adversarial images to one of the two classes (the groundtruth class and the target
class). The order of these two classes was randomized and the adversarial images appeared for 2 seconds in the middle of
the screen on each trial. After disappearing, the participant had unlimited time to select the more feasible class according to
her perception. For each participant, one could only conduct at most 50 trials, and each adversarial image was shown to 5
different participants.
